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Abstract
This paper demonstrates that a robust, tacit collusion evolves quickly in a collusion
incubator environment, but is destroyed by the simultaneous, descending price auction.
Theories of collusion-producing behavior, along with the detail of the states on which
strategies are conditioned, lead to a deeper understanding of how tacit collusion evolves
and its necessary conditions. These theories explain how the descending price auction
destroys the collusion. The experiments proceed by conducting simultaneous ascend-
ing price auctions in the collusion incubator. Then, once the tacit collusion developed,
changing to the descending auction. The change moved prices from collusive levels to
near competitive levels. . .
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 This paper explores the relationship between the market institutional (auction) 
environments, the preferences of multiple buyers over multiple items, and the outcomes that can 
be expected to evolve from the institutions. *  The paper focuses on how tacit collusion develops 
and institutions that might prevent it.  The “collusion incubator,” a very special economic 
environment, was constructed to facilitate “tacit collusion” under the continuous, simultaneous 
ascending price auction.  It was successful.  Tacit collusion developed and the process of tacit 
collusion development was studied.  Once tacit collusion was firmly developed, the institution 
was changed to a simultaneous descending price auction, while keeping the underlying, collusion 
incubator environment constant.  The change in institution resulted in the unraveling of the tacit 
collusion, and the market prices evolved to near competitive levels.  The process of “collusion 
unraveling” is studied and tied to particular features of descending price auctions. 
 Three features of the study are emphasized.  (1) The power of the “collusion incubator” 
environment to foster tacit collusion under the continuous, simultaneous ascending price auction 
is studied.  The tacit collusion facilitating power of this environment was first established by Li 
and Plott (this volume) and the property strongly replicates here.  (2) The “tacit collusion 
breaking power” of the continuous, simultaneous descending price auction is identified and 
established for the first time.  (3) The behavior of the market is modeled as a process of 
equilibrium selection.  The data are examined for clues about how the selection takes place and 
what features might give it robustness properties. 
 The paper consists of seven sections including this introduction.  The second section 
below reviews background literature. The third section describes the economic and institutional 
                                                 
* The financial support of the National Science Foundation, the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and 
Political Science and the Lee Center for Advanced Networking is gratefully acknowledged.  The authors benefited 
from comments of Jin Li, Katerina Sherstyuk, Ian Krajbich, and an anonymous referee. 
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environment.  The fourth section describes the experimental design.  The fifth section addresses 
issues of theory and predictions, beginning with a brief summary of previous results. The sixth 
section contains the results, and the final section is a summary of conclusions. 
 At the outset, an introductory comment about the special economic environment 
employed is needed.  The environment is characterized by special “item aligned” and “folded” 
preferences that will be discussed in detail below.  In essence, each buyer can be identified with 
an item for which the buyer has the unique highest value, thus, the term “item aligned.”  In 
addition, the preferences involve a special type of interdependence in which pairs find 
themselves in competition over their most preferred items, thus the term “folded.”  This pairing 
directly ties to theoretical models of collusion which generally involve only two buyers and not 
more.  All of this is public information in the sense that unless otherwise stated as a treatment, all 
preferences were known to all participants.  The Li and Plott discovery is that within this special 
environment tacit collusion evolves quickly under the continuous simultaneous ascending price 
auction and is remarkably robust in the sense that once developed it was not substantially altered 
by changes in the information structure.1  The strategy of this research is to study how tacit 
collusion develops and to test its robustness against a substantial change in the institutional and 
informational environment.  
 For policy, one would like to understand how tacit collusion develops and dissolves in 
the hope that it would help identify the types of institutions that would cause the system to 
evolve from the tacit collusive equilibrium to the competitive equilibrium or equally important, 
evolve from competition to tacit collusion.  For market policies, the “remedies” that discourage 
tacit collusion have desirable properties.  On the other hand, cooperation among buyers is a type 
                                                 
1 Li and Plott found one collusion breaking intervention.  It involved giving subjects identical valuations.  This paper 
attempts to break collusion without drastically changing valuation structure.   
3  
of solution to a “public goods” problem; a greater understanding of this cooperation may benefit 
public goods policy.  Thus, regardless of the point of view, a deeper understanding of the process 
of “tacit” collusion and the institutions that discourage it or encourage it are of interest.  That 
fundamental understanding motivates the research. 
2.  BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
 Several experiments have attempted to initiate and sustain collusive equilibria in various 
markets.  The first experiments allow subjects to discuss strategy before they trade.  Isaac and 
Plott (1981) find unsuccessful attempts at collusion when subjects were allowed to discuss 
strategy before entering an oral double auction.  The success or failure of attempts to collude are 
related to the structure of the market institutions (Clauser and Plott, 1993).  Isaac and Walker 
(1985) conclude communication “fosters bid rigging cartels” when subjects have time to 
communicate between trading periods.  Kagel (1995) in his survey of auction experiments notes 
he has produced lower than competitive prices in auctions with an Isaac and Walker design.  
Kagel concedes that with one exception “outright collusion has not been reported under standard 
experimental procedures.”  That exception concerns one of five trials, is fleeting and never 
unanimous among subjects. 
 Studies more recent than Kagel report collusion.  By allowing bid matching in a 
simultaneous ascending auction, Sherstyuk (1999) finds sustained collusion with three buyers 
and two items with equal and commonly known values.  In her next work, the same design 
produces collusion with private values (Sherstyuk, 2002).  Surprisingly, that study also finds 
collusive equilibria in trials without bid-matching.  Sherstyuk hypothesizes that subjects colluded 
over the repeated playing of the auction.  Grimm and Engelmann (2006) identify some tacit 
collusion with two items and buyers in an ascending clock auction.  Kwasnica and Sherstyuk 
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(2007) find the first systematic evidence of buyer collusion in simultaneous price auctions 
without communication or bid matching. 2  Their result does not hold for more than two buyers.   
 A few studies offer evidence of sustained collusive equilibria with more than two buyers.  
Kwasnica (2000) reports collusion with five buyers and five objects in an experiment with 
communication.  Phillips et al., (2003) find collusion among six buyers in trials with and without 
communication.  Curiously, buyers in groups of six were better coordinated than buyers in 
groups of two in their study.  Li and Plott (2005) provide a robust collusive equilibrium using a 
specific valuation structure with eight buyers and eight items.  This experiment will replicate this 
last design and attempt to disrupt the equilibrium. 
3. EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT 
 3.1 Items and Preferences: the Collusion Incubator 
 This experiment used the preference environment invented by Li and Plott.  For all 
rounds of all experiments, there were eight buyers and eight items to purchase.  Buyers received 
valuations each round.  Their profits were determined by the sum of the difference between their 
valuation of an item they obtained and its purchase price.  In this way, valuations can be thought 
of as redemption values.  Valuations would vary, but the following features were preserved in all 
rounds: 
i. Each buyer had a strict preference ordering for the eight items. 
ii. No item had the same nominal value for any two buyers. 
iii. For every item, there is exactly one buyer that valued it nth (n=1,2,…8) in his 
preference ordering. 
                                                 
2 Kwasnica and Sherstyuk also find some evidence of retaliation by buyers facilitating collusion.  Retaliatory 
strategies will be a central theme in this paper and is discussed in detail in the theory (section 5) and results (section 
6) sections of this paper.    
5  
iv. (Buyer Aligned) If a buyer valued an item nth in his preference ordering, then he had 
the nth highest valuation of that item among all buyers.  In particular, a buyer had the 
highest valuation for his most preferred item among all buyers. 
v. (Folded Preferences) If buyer i valued buyer j’s most preferred item nth, then buyer j 
valued buyer i’s most preferred item nth. 
Table 1 provides a sample valuation table. 
 From the symmetry of the preference relations, it is possible to define “partners”.  Buyer i 
is buyer j’s partner if he values j’s most preferred item second in his preference ordering.  By 
condition (v), j will value i’s most preferred item second most in his preference ordering.  By 
condition (iv), j will value his most preferred item at a higher nominal value than any other 
buyer.  Buyer i will value that item higher than all buyers but j.  Using condition (iv), an 
analogous statement can be made about buyer i’s most preferred item.  In Table 1, buyers 121 
and 122, 123 and 124, 125 and 126, and 127 and 128 are partners. 
 Interrelationships exist among the properties.  The buyer-aligned property allows a type 
of “ownership” to an item that is public knowledge.  In a sense, it is clear which item is buyer 
i’s.3  The folded preference structure interacts with partners to create a type of coordination of 
actions. Partners can achieve a better outcome by not bidding on each other’s item.  Next, those 
pairs of buyers who value each other’s most preferred item third may evolve into a partner 
relationship and thus can recognize the possibility of improved outcome by not bidding on each 
other’s item.  Once this process unravels at the eighth level, total tacit collusion is reached. 
Most likely, this pair-wise unraveling improves the chance of collusion among eight 
buyers.  Most theory (Ausubel and Schwartz, 1999; Milgrom, 2000; Brusco and Lopomo, 2002; 
                                                 
3 This assumption appears elsewhere in the literature.  Pesendorfer (2000) constructs a “ranking mechanism” to 
assign items to buyers in a cartel in an incentive compatible and asymptotically ex-ante efficient way.  Trivially, that 
mechanism assigns each buyer in this experiment his most preferred item. 
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Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 2005; Albano et al, 2006 [1]; Albano et al, 2006 [2]) and 
experiments (Kwasnica and Sherstyuk, 2007; Grimm and Engelmann, 2006) suggest collusion 
occurs between two buyers but not more.  Experimental studies confirm the difficulty of 
coordination in groups of more than two (Van Huyck et al, 1990), albeit in different types of 
games.  This collusion incubator’s structure allows buyers to coordinate with their partner first, 
make real profits from that cooperation, and continue.  The process towards total collusion may 
occur through steps of bilateral cooperation. 
 3.2 Institutions 
 This experiment will use both a simultaneous ascending price auction (SAPA) and 
simultaneous descending price auction (SDPA).  Both auctions are called simultaneous because 
once either auction begins, a buyer can bid on any of the eight items at the same time.  In the 
SAPA, a buyer can continue to bid on any of the eight items until the auction closes.  Then he 
cannot bid on any item.  In the SDPA, the descending price clock -- the price at which a buyer 
can purchase any of the eight items – starts at the same price and counts down at the same rate 
for each item.  (Thus, at any moment, any previously unpurchased item can be purchased at the 
same price.) Once a buyer bids on any of the eight items, it is purchased.  Table 2 shows the 
procedural differences between each auction. 
 In the SAPA, the reserve bid was 10 and each buyer was allowed to submit bids in 
increments of 10 on any item.4  The round ended when there were no bids placed for a certain 
amount of time (usually 30 seconds).  The SDPA started at 900 and decreased at a rate of 2 
francs per second.  Subjects interacted with the auction software entirely using the mouse on 
their computer.  Buyers bid by clicking arrows to determine the amount of their bid, clicked the 
                                                 
4 This value is important: the large difference between reservation price and competitive price creates large gains 
from collusion.  Great gains foster collusion even when not predicted by theory (Sherstyuk, 2002). 
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items they wished to bid on, and clicked a button to confirm in the SAPA. In the SDPA, they 
only clicked on the items and a button to buy because the clock determined the bid in that 
auction.  The computer’s internal clock was precise enough to avoid any simultaneous bidding.  
Subjects learned immediately in either auction when an item was bid on or purchased. 5 
 3.3 Information 
 Before the experiment began, subjects were briefed on the ascending price auction and 
given valuation sheets.  They were told the valuation sheets were common to all subjects.  They 
were told that each subject had a specific ID that would not change during the session.  It was not 
disclosed that the experiment would switch to a descending price auction.  That type of auction 
was not mentioned until the period before the auction occurred.  In experiments #4 and #6 in 
which subject IDs were later removed, subjects were not told of this change until the period 
before the IDs were removed.  In that condition, subjects were still given valuation sheets 
without subject numbers to show that the valuation structure was still intact. 
4. PROCEDURES AND DESIGN 
 4.1 Experimental Procedures  
 Six experiments were run at the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political 
Science at Caltech.  These experiments lasted between 1.5 and 2.5 hours.  Subjects were 
recruited from Caltech undergraduate economics courses.  Their pay ranged from $25-$75 for 
one experiment.  Subjects participated in both auctions using computer software in the 
laboratory.  Dividers were used to prohibit a subject from observing the screens of others.  The 
subjects first learned how a SAPA auction worked and were not told there would be any changes 
to the design of the experiment.  They were asked to record their purchases in the auction to 
reinforce the concepts of price and value.  They were given a screenshot of the auction software 
                                                 
5 See appendix 2 for screenshots of the bidding mechanisms. 
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with arrows so they could understand all aspects of the software.  The screenshot as well as 
subject instructions are available in Appendix 2.  Before each round, subjects were given a 
valuation sheet with all subject values for each item (similar to Table 1).  These values were in 
francs and subjects were paid in cash at the end of the experiment at the rate of 1 cent = 2 francs. 
 4.2 Experimental Design/Environment 
 Table 3 shows more detail about the experimental environment. 
 After experiments 1-3 had been run, it was suggested that some cooperative bids in the 
SDPA occurred because subjects earned reputations over multiple periods.  To examine this 
belief, the software was modified to allow the removal of subject IDs.  This modification was 
used in experiments #4 and #6.  It was designed to be used after subjects had experienced a few 
periods in the SDPA with subject IDs. 
 After collusion, the outcome where each subject obtains his most preferred item at its 
reservation price, had occurred for three or more periods, subjects were told about the SDPA and 
the computers were switched to that auction.  All remaining periods would be in the SDPA.  If 
subjects were unable to sustain collusion and there was less than forty minutes remaining in the 
experiment, subjects were also switched to the SDPA.  This occurred in experiments #1 and #6.  
In experiments #4 and #6, to examine effects of reputation, subject IDs were removed from the 
computer screen and the valuation sheets.   
5.  MODELS AND SOLUTION CONCEPTS 
 In the experiment, buyers encounter unique valuations of items in a complete information 
setting. Preference information is public (unless otherwise indicated for special exercise).  This 
environment differs from other simultaneous ascending price models that study environments 
with private information (Brusco and Lopomo, 2002; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 2005), 
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budget constraints (Milgrom, 2000; Benoit and Krishna, 2001), and homogenous items (Ausubel 
and Schwartz, 1999).  These aforementioned models have one equilibrium, while similar models 
applied to the environment studied here have an infinite number.6 
Two allocations are of special significance and will become part of equilibria depending 
on the institution.  In the simultaneous ascending price auction, a continuum of equilibria fall 
between the two allocations. In the simultaneous descending price auction, only one equilibrium 
exists. The competitive (seller preferred) allocation has each buyer receiving his most preferred 
option and paying its second highest value. The tacit collusive (buyer preferred) allocation has 
each buyer receiving his most preferred item and paying 10 francs (the minimum possible bid). 7 
 Equilibrium strategies supporting allocations as equilibria depend on concepts of 
“retaliation” and “punishing” strategies, techniques which are available to buyers in the SAPA 
but not in the SDPA.  Known preferences allow a description of “a buyer’s item” in the sense 
that it is theoretically clear that a buyer will end up buying the item that he prefers most.  With 
this in mind, two concepts of retaliation can be developed for theoretical purposes.  It is 
important to notice that these concepts do not depend on prices or the level of bids and instead 
depend only on the concept of “a buyer’s item”.  First, narrow retaliation has a buyer placing a 
bid on the most preferred item of anyone who bids on the buyer’s item.  Second, broad 
retaliation has the buyer bidding on all items if anyone bids on his most preferred item.  An 
additional concept, passive response involves the buyer bidding on his most preferred item to a 
level where no other buyer would value it. 
                                                 
6 Other differences between the auction institutions discussed in this paper and some of the theoretical literature is 
that this auction format features multiple items with simultaneous bids as opposed to a single unit auction.  The 
greater number of items may make collusion easier.  However, McCabe et al., (1990) suggest single unit results can 
be generalized to multi-unit auctions. 
7 The buyer preferred allocation also has the property that it is joint payoff maximizing for all buyers and fully 
efficient.  Additionally, each buyer is receiving roughly the same level of profit in the allocation, perhaps appealing 
to a sense of distributive justice.  However these properties still remain in the descending price auction, where the 
buyer preferred allocation cannot be obtained. 
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The following theorems apply to the specific auction environments used in this paper. 
Theorem 1. Under the SAPA, the competitive allocation (seller preferred allocation) can be 
supported as a Nash Equilibrium. This is defined as the competitive (seller preferred) 
equilibrium.  
Proof:  Intuitively, if each buyer bids his valuation on all items other than the buyer’s own item 
and bids the second valuation plus epsilon on his most preferred item, there is neither incentive 
nor retaliatory reason to bid further.  This is the standard result for ascending (and second price) 
auctions (Vickrey, 1961).  A formal statement is found in Lemma 3 that provides one set of 
strategies that produce the seller preferred allocation as an equilibrium.8 
 By contrast to Theorem 1, the following Theorems 2 and 3 draw on retaliation 
possibilities. If all buyers follow retaliatory strategies, and if all buyers bid the minimum (or any 
other level) on their item and only their item no buyer has an incentive to change his behavior.   
Theorem 2. Under the SAPA, the tacit collusive (buyer preferred) allocation can be supported as 
a Nash Equilibrium either with broad or narrow retaliation. This paper defines either allocation 
under either form of support as the tacit collusive (buyer preferred) equilibrium.  
Proof:  Lemma 1 proves the buyer preferred allocation can be sustained as an equilibrium when 
all buyers play broad retaliation strategies.  Corollary 1 proves it can be sustained when all 
buyers play narrow retaliation strategies.  Basically, if any buyer can obtain his most preferred 
item at the reservation price, and will face retaliation for bidding on another’s item, it is a best-
response to bid the reservation price on his item.  Bidding on another’s item will not win him 
that item (the buyer who prefers it most will take it back) and he will have to bid a higher price 
to obtain his most preferred item (because the retaliation featured a bid on his most preferred 
item). 
                                                 
8 See Appendix 1 for all Lemmas and Corollaries mentioned in this section. 
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Theorem 3.  A continuum of equilibria exist between the competitive and the tacitly collusive 
equilibria. 
Proof:  Lemma 4 shows any allocation with prices on items between the reservation price and 
second highest valuation of that item can be sustained as an equilibrium with appropriate 
retaliatory bidding. 
  A dramatic difference exists between the equilibrium properties of the SDPA and the 
SAPA.9  It is made clear from the following theorems. 
Theorem 4.  The competitive (seller preferred) allocation can be supported as a Nash 
equilibrium under the SDPA.  As before, this will be called the competitive (seller preferred) 
equilibrium. 
Proof:  Lemma 5 shows the seller-preferred allocation can be sustained as an equilibrium if all 
buyers bid on all non-preferred items that fall below their valuation, and epsilon above the 
second highest valuation of their most preferred item. 
Theorem 5. Under the SDPA, the tacit collusive (buyer preferred) allocation cannot be 
supported as an equilibrium.  
Proof:  Follows directly from Lemma 6. 
 In a single stage auction,10 the SDPA does not have equilibria below the second 
valuation, compared to a continuum of equilibriums in the SAPA.  The seller-preferred equilibria 
                                                 
9 Comparisons between ascending and descending price auction have a rich history in economics literature. When 
valuations are independently drawn from the same distribution and unknown to other buyers - which does not apply 
in these environments (this auction has personal values that are known with certainty to all buyers before bidding) - 
auction theory predicts the ascending and descending auctions should give the same revenue to the seller of an item 
(Vickrey, 1961).  Experiments contradict this prediction; descending auctions generally have lower prices in those 
cases (Cox et al 1982; Cox et al 1983; Kagel 1995). 
10 Additional equilibrium concepts, which will not be explored here, can be derived from the fact that in these 
experiments, subjects participate in the SDPA over multiple rounds with an indefinite end.  This results in far more 
possibilities for equilibria than the single stage equivalent.  This paper does not model any of these multiple stage 
equilibria.  It is generally believed repeated play will promote collusion (Fouraker and Siegel, 1963; Sherstyuk, 
forthcoming). 
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exists (Theorem 4) under both institutions.  Notice intuitively that any outcome in which a buyer 
does not receive his item, either another buyer loses on the purchase, or he could do better by 
bidding higher.  If any buyer receives his most preferred item at a level above its second highest 
valuation, he could do better by bidding at its second highest valuation and still acquire his item 
with certainty.  If any buyer receives his most preferred item at a level below its second highest 
valuation, the buyer who values it second could do better by bidding epsilon above his bid.  A 
formal proof of this argument is given in Lemma 6. 
 Theorem 5 relies on fact that in the SDPA each bid is final.11  The price falls and once a 
buyer enters a bid for an item, he purchases it at that value. If a buyer has already purchased his 
most preferred item or purchases at the same time as another item, he has eliminated the 
possibility of retaliation by other buyers for that round.  Even if retaliation were possible, the 
finality of bids creates a real cost.  Each retaliation costs its deliverer a certain loss if the buyer 
bids more than his own value.  In auctions in which bids are not final such as the SAPA, 
retaliation may be costless.  A buyer may bid on an item at a potential loss to himself, but the 
buyer who values the item most may outbid him.  In the SDPA, this cannot occur.  The equilibria 
discussed in Theorems 2 and 3 in the SAPA relied on retaliation strategies. 
 In summary, the model suggests important properties of the SDPA:  the finality of bids, 
punishment with certain costs, no single stage buyer preferred equilibria; are all characteristics 
the SAPA does not have.  Such features lead to an understanding of the facts that are outlined in 
the next section that tacit collusion develops in the SAPA and is destroyed when the SDPA is 
imposed.12 
                                                 
11 This property is analogous to the sealed-bid ascending auction, which is suggested to be more robust against 
collusion than the increasing ascending auction (Robinson, 1985). 
12 A similar theoretical result, Albano et al [1], [2] (2006) find that the Japanese ascending clock auction has fewer 
equilibria than the simultaneous ascending price auction, and is more robust against collusion. 
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6. RESULTS  
Figures 1A-1F show average price levels over all rounds in each of the six experiments and 
illustrate the patterns of results.  Under the simultaneous ascending price auction (SAPA), the 
prices evolved downward to the buyer preferred allocation.  Each buyer receives his most 
preferred option at the lowest possible price.  The institutional change to the simultaneous 
descending price auction (SDPA), indicated by the leftmost vertical bar, causes the prices to 
move from the buyer preferred to a region near the seller preferred.  Further analysis is divided in 
two subsections of results.  The first section addresses the SAPA, and the second section is 
focused on the SDPA. 
 Part 6.1: The Simultaneous Ascending Price Auction 
Eight results are listed.  Together they provide a precise analysis of the pattern of results together 
with an empirical explanation of why the patterns are seen.  The first result states that an 
equilibrium is attained. The next seven results show how that equilibrium result is attained 
through a series of punishing and retaliatory strategies aimed at creating an incentive for all 
buyers to behave in a tacitly collusive manner.  
 
Result 1-1:  Within the collusion incubator environment, the SAPA reaches the buyer-
preferred equilibrium and tends to stay at the buyer-preferred equilibrium once reached. 
Support.  The buyer-preferred equilibrium is the buyer-preferred allocation supported by 
equilibrium consistent behavior.  Essentially, the strategy is for every buyer to bid the minimum 
possible bid on “his” item and to bid on no other item.  Theorem 2 states that such a 
correspondence between allocation and strategy happens if and only if all buyers receive their 
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most preferred allocation at the minimum price.  Thus, it need only be shown that the buyer-
preferred allocation occurs and is sustained.  
The buyer-preferred allocation is reached but not necessarily sustained in five of six 
experiments and in the sixth it is reached for all items but one.  In three experiments, the 
equilibrium is sustained without movement for more than three periods and in the other three, the 
movement is easily explained.  Figures 1A-1F show the average sale price in each round of each 
experiment.  For all rounds, the buyer preferred equilibrium is 10.  In experiment 2 rounds 9-11, 
experiment 3 rounds 9-11, experiment 4 rounds 8-11, experiment 5 round 15, and experiment 6 
rounds 16-17, the average price is 10.  In all cases, each buyer obtained his most preferred item 
at the reservation price.  In experiment 1 round 10, all but one buyer obtained their most 
preferred item at that price.  The average price for that round was 11.25.  
In three experiments, time constraints (i.e. that the intuitions were switched if less than 40 
minutes remained in the experiment) prevented the observation of subjects staying at the buyer-
preferred equilibrium for three rounds.  In experiment 1, the subjects were close to the buyer-
preferred equilibrium before the auction institution switched.  In experiment 5, subjects were 
under an average price of 20 in three other rounds before the switch.  In experiment 6, round 18, 
the movement away from the buyer-preferred equilibrium can be explained by the bids of one 
subject, defined later in this paper as a “maverick”, a type of subject that plays an important role 
in the analysis.  
 The data indicate the buyer-preferred allocation occurs and is sustained, supporting the 
idea of an equilibrium being reached.  However, when each buyer obtains his most preferred 
item at the reservation price, it is not known what type of strategy he would use if another buyer 
had bid on his item.  It is suspected buyers would retaliate against other buyers as in Theorem 2, 
15  
but other strategies such as passive response can support a weakly dominant Nash Equilibrium.  
Evidence of retaliatory bidding in the bid functions is studied in results 1-6, 1-7, and 1-8.  The 
next result establishes the existence of a convergence process.  Prices and allocations of items 
move to the buyer-preferred level over time.  The nature of the movement and the dynamics of 
strategy changes are addressed in the Result 1-3.  
 
Result 1-2:  Within the collusion incubator environment, the SAPA is characterized by a 
convergence process across rounds detectable as movement from near the seller preferred 
allocation toward the buyer preferred equilibrium through price decreases, a decreasing 
number of bids and decreasing time duration of the auction.  
Support.  Figures 1A-1F show the average sale price in each round of each experiment.  In all 
six figures, there is a clear downward trend before the switch to the SDPA.  Figures 2A-2B 
group all experiments together and show the number of bids and duration of the SAPA for each 
round.  Figures 2A-2B have a downward trend similar to figures 1A-1F, although not as 
profound.  The visual impression of a downward trend is captured by the regressions shown in 
Table 4.  Table 4 shows three regressions on average price, duration of auction and bid number 
over all rounds.  Allowing for dummy variables for each experiment,13 all three dependent 
variables are negatively correlated with round (see row labeled “round” on table 4 for 
coefficients).  Thus average price duration and number of bids all decrease as the round number 
increases.  All three results are significant at the 0.001 level.  Uncharacteristically, the average 
price went up in round 18 after staying at the buyer-preferred equilibrium for two rounds in 
                                                 
13 There is no dummy variable for experiment 1 because the regression contains a constant.  With dummy variables 
for each experiment and a constant, the regressors would be linearly dependent.  Removing a constant and adding a 
dummy variable increases the significance of each dummy variable and r-squared.  Both regressions give the same 
coefficient and standard error of any other variable.   
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experiment 6.  The regressions show the price increase in round 18 does not significantly weaken 
result 1-2.  One subject is responsible for the price increase in round 18 (see result 1-5 for more 
detail).    
 Central to the analysis that follows is a concept of cooperative behavior. For each round 
buyers will be classified as exhibiting cooperative or non-cooperative behavior. A buyer exhibits 
cooperative behavior in a round if all his bids are one of the following14     
1) Bids on his most preferred item. 
2) Bids on the most preferred item of another buyer are placed only if the other 
buyer has previously bid on his most preferred item in that round (i.e. retaliation). 
3) Bids above his valuation on another buyer’s most preferred item (defined later as 
punishment). 
 
If all of a buyer’s bids for a round do not satisfy the aforementioned definition, he is said 
to exhibit non-cooperative behavior for that round.  Buyers that persistently exhibit non-
cooperative behavior will be identified as “mavericks” (see Result 1-5).   
 
Result 1-3:  The dynamics of price movements can be described as a shift from non-
cooperative behavior to cooperative behavior that is neither abrupt nor instantaneous.     
i. Subjects begin with non-cooperative behavior and switch from non-cooperative to 
cooperative behavior at different points. 
ii. Subjects switch from non-cooperative to cooperative behavior at a relatively steady 
rate.   
                                                 
14 There are a few key differences between the paper’s definition of a cooperative behavior and Li and Plott’s.  First, 
Li and Plott allow a cooperator to bid on someone else’s item that has remained at the reservation price for more 
than 60 seconds; this paper does not.  Bidding after 60 seconds on another’s item happened rarely in the 
experiments.  In all cases, the item eventually went to the buyer with highest valuation, so the first bid raised prices 
above the buyer preferred level.  Hence, bidding after 60 seconds on another’s item appears to be non-cooperative 
behavior.  Second, the third criterion considers “punishment bids” to be cooperative.  Usually cooperative 
punishments are retaliatory and covered by the second criterion.  However, a cooperative subject may try to punish a 
non-cooperative subject to enforce cooperation even when that subject has not bid on his item in the current round. 
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iii. Prices decrease at a steady rate, reflecting that subjects gradually switch from non-
cooperative to cooperative behavior. 
Support: (i) For each round, a buyer’s bids are classified as cooperative or non-cooperative.  
Tables 5-10 show whether subjects are classified as cooperative (represented by a 0) or non-
cooperative (represented by a 1) for each round in each experiment.  The rightmost column of 
the table shows the total number of rounds each subject was non-cooperative.  As the disparate 
totals indicate, some subjects were more cooperative in each experiment than others.  Also, 
subjects began to first cooperate (indicated by the first 0 in each subject’s row) at different points 
of the experiment.  As Table 5 shows, some subjects began cooperatively (125, 126, 128), or 
began to cooperate after the first 1-2 rounds (124, 127).  Others subjects were non-cooperative 
for a majority of the rounds (121, 122, 123).  Each buyer did not exhibit the same type of 
behavior.  
(ii) Figure 3A shows the number of non-cooperative subjects decreases steadily for the first 
ten rounds over all the experiments.  Notice that the trend line decreases at a fairly steady rate.  
Figure 3B shows the number of non-cooperative subjects over time by experiment for the first 
four experiments.  For each experiment, the decline of non-cooperative subjects is not constant, 
but still occurs gradually.  Figure 3C shows the same results for experiment 5 and 6, which are 
looked at separately since subjects in those experiments took considerably longer to reach the 
buyer-preferred equilibrium and hence featured more SAPA rounds.  Table 4 shows a regression 
of round number on cooperative subjects with experiment as dummy variables.  The table 
indicates (first row, fourth column) that moving to the next round increases the number of 
cooperative subjects by 0.41.  The standard error on the coefficient of each round is small 
(0.028), indicating that the coefficient is neither negative (p<0.001) nor greater than one 
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(p<0.001).  Thus, the number of cooperative subjects increases after each round, but increases at 
a relatively small rate. 
(iii) Figures 1A-1F show a gradual decrease in average price over all experiments. Comparing 
Figure 3B and 3C to Figures 1A-1F, it is clear that as the number of non-cooperative subjects 
decreases, the closer the price is to the buyer-preferred equilibrium.  For instance, figure 3C 
shows there is one remaining non-cooperative subject after round 9 of experiment 5; figure 1E 
shows after round 9 average prices never exceed 300.  When there were more uncooperative 
subjects (before round 9), average prices exceeded 300.       
 
Result 1-4:  The changes from non-cooperative behavior to cooperative behavior are 
permanent and together yield a “regime shift” as opposed to an ephemeral deviation. 
Support.  Tables 5-10 show the shift in subject behavior from non-cooperative to cooperative is 
generally permanent – of all the rounds where a subject was cooperative they remained 
cooperative 93% (351 of 379 instances) of the time.  If a subject does regress from cooperative to 
non-cooperative, it usually is for one period.  Table 8 provides an example of these changes in 
experiment 4.  All subjects changed from cooperative to non-cooperative at some point in the 
experiment, subject 121 and 126 became cooperative immediately.  Subjects 121 and 127 
regressed from cooperative to non-cooperative in rounds 3 and 6 respectively, but switched to 
cooperative permanently in the next round.  All subjects were observed to have cooperative 
behavior for at least four periods, indicating their shift is permanent. 
 The regressions of Table 4 support the idea of a regime shift further.  The coefficients on 
average price are negative and those on cooperative subjects are positive at any reasonable 
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significance level (p<0.001).  There is no sustained trend in the SAPA of an increase in price or 
decrease in cooperative behavior in any of the graphs and tables.   
Table 11 provides a regression using the model of Noussair et al, (1995) to estimate 
convergence to a price level.   It is written as  
        uttBtDBtDBtDBy iiit  1/1/1/1 26161111  . 
The term i indicates the particular experiment number, t is the round number in the SAPA, iD  is 
a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for values from experiment i and 0 otherwise, and iB1  is 
the origin of a possible convergence process for experiment i.  If t=1 the value of the dependent 
variable is equal to iB1  for experiment i.  2B is the asymptote of the dependent variable.  The 
term u is the random error term distributed normally with mean zero.  The predicted value of 2B , 
the estimated average price that all ascending auctions should converge to, is 116.   
 Granted, this coefficient is unlikely to be 10 or less (p-value 0.00035), the buyer-
preferred level, but it is far less likely to be greater than the seller-preferred level 766.125 (p-
value 5.63 x 10-35).  If the seller and buyer-preferred level were the only possible price levels for 
convergence, the buyer-preferred level is considerably (5.63 x 1030 times) more likely.  Hence, if 
the regression model holds and the experiment was run indefinitely, the decrease in price would 
converge to a level other than the seller-preferred.  If convergence could only occur at the buyer-
preferred or seller-preferred levels, it would occur at the buyer-preferred.  The shift away from a 
competitive equilibrium is permanent.   
 An important type of buyer will be defined as a “maverick”, a buyer who acts non-
cooperatively for three consecutive rounds after at least five (a majority) other subjects are acting 
cooperatively.  Often the maverick bids up items that were not his highest valued for many 
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periods longer than other buyers.  In some experiments, there appears to be more than one 
maverick.15  
 
Result 1-5:  All experiments contained at least one maverick.  
Support. Tables 5-10 reveal that in all experiments there is always at least one non-cooperative 
hold-out that is defined as a maverick.  For example, in experiment 5 subject 128 is the only 
person behaving non-cooperatively in rounds 9-14.  Tables 5-10 show that the maverick(s) for 
experiment 1 is 122, for experiment 2 are 125 and 128, for experiment 3 are 121 and 122, and for 
experiment 4 is 128.  In experiment 6, there appears to be 3 mavericks.  Starting in round 9, 
subjects 121, 122 and 125 are the only subjects to be non-cooperative.  All three are non-
cooperative in rounds 9-11, 13-14 and at least one of them is non-cooperative during rounds 9-15 
and round 18.  
 Note that once the mavericks(s) exhibit cooperative behavior, the buyer-preferred 
equilibrium is reached.  For example, in experiment 4 round 8, the buyer-preferred equilibrium is 
reached once number 128 cooperates. 
 “Non-cooperative bids” will be defined as bids placed by a buyer that are on items that 
are not the buyer’s highest valued item.  Note that the definition of non-cooperative bids includes 
punishment and retaliatory bidding as special cases of non-cooperative.  Thus, a buyer classified 
as cooperative in a round may have used non-cooperative bids if they were in response to non-
                                                 
15 This definition of mavericks avoids a tautological argument.  An easy way to identify mavericks would be to see 
how often they bid, how high they bid, etc.  However, identifying mavericks based on how they drive up prices and 
then making the point that they drive up prices is circular reasoning.  Notice that the definition of maverick used 
here is not based on prices.  Instead, the definition is based on whether they bid on other people’s highest valued 
items without the other people bidding on their highest valued item first.  Hence, the paper identifies the presence of 
a “maverick” that sustains uncooperative behavior longer than others, and can examine whether or not the maverick 
is important in driving up prices and can undertake the examination without using tautological reasoning.  Of course, 
by definition, the presence of the maverick prohibits the buyer-preferred equilibrium from being reached. 
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cooperative bids by others. “Cooperative” as used here, is intended to be different from the 
intuitive notion of passive. 
 The next result identifies a type of selective response of non-mavericks.  In particular, it 
involves the use of narrow (directed) retaliation strategies, bidding on the item of someone who 
bid on yours, as opposed to broad (undirected) retaliation strategies (retaliating against everyone 
if anyone bid on yours) that were defined in Section 5.  Recall, the buyer-preferred equilibrium 
described in Theorem 2 can be sustained with either type of strategy. 
 
Result 1-6:  After a few rounds, mavericks make or receive (are tied to) all of the non-
cooperative bids in each experiment.  Non-mavericks respond to non-cooperative bids by 
the maverick on their most preferred items with non-cooperative bids on the maverick’s 
most preferred item.  Non-mavericks do not respond to the mavericks’ bidding by 
retaliating against any other buyer.   
Support.  Figures 4A-4F show for each round and experiment the percent of all non-cooperative 
bids that are either bids by the maverick on the most preferred of someone else or bids by others 
on the most preferred of the maverick in retaliation.  The proportion of non-cooperative bids tied 
to the bids of the maverick are shown at the total and the figure separates the percentage of these 
bids made by the maverick on the “items of others” and the bids of others on maverick’s most 
preferred in retaliation.  The percentage of non-cooperative bids tied to the bids of the maverick 
begin as a low percentage during the first rounds but that percentage quickly increases to near 
100%.  This increase of the percentage is due to a reduction of non-cooperative bids by those 
other than the maverick except bids made as retaliation. If multiple mavericks were identified the 
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figures reflect the non-cooperative bids tied to all of them even though one maverick was usually 
far more responsible for the non-cooperative bids than the other.   
     The figures indicate that in all experiments the mavericks are usually responsible for the vast 
majority (if not all) and those not submitted by the maverick are tied to the bids of the maverick. 
This is especially true in later rounds of the experiment.  For instance, Figure 4B shows two 
mavericks are tied to a majority of non-cooperative bids in rounds 2-7 and all non-cooperative 
bids in rounds 5-7.  Thus, mavericks hold the most responsibility for the buyer-preferred 
equilibrium not being reached sooner.  In experiment 6, one of the mavericks (121) is solely 
responsible for the buyer-preferred equilibrium not being sustained in round 18. The figures 
suggest that only a small number of retaliations (taken as a percentage of all non-cooperative 
bids) are needed to discourage the maverick from bidding non-cooperatively but Figure 4E round 
14 illustrates that retaliations can be numerous. In that period, all non-cooperative bids were tied 
to the maverick who made about 75% of them and the other 25% of the non-cooperative bids 
were made by others on the most preferred of the maverick.  
 
Corollary 1-6:  Narrow (directed) retaliation rather than broad retaliation or passive 
response is the most likely strategy associated with the buyer preferred equilibrium in 
result 1-1. 
Support.  Theorem 2 states a buyer preferred equilibrium would exist with either broad or 
narrow retaliation (shown in Corollary 1 and Lemma 1, respectively).  Buyers do not retaliate 
when the buyer-preferred allocation is sustained because there is no need.  But, result 1-6 shows 
that when buyers bid on items which are not their most preferred, they are met with narrow 
(directed) retaliation.  Of course, after this deviation occurs, the state is not the buyer-preferred 
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equilibrium.  It is very likely that if any buyer deviated at the buyer preferred allocation he would 
face narrow retaliation identical to the type observed in result 1-6.  Thus, the evidence indicates 
buyers retaliate against the maverick for his bidding and not everyone else.  Buyers are closer to 
playing the strategies described in Corollary 1 than Lemma 1.  
 The next results concern punishment and/or spiteful behavior in the SAPA portion of the 
experiments. Both likely exist in the auction, but the paper will use restraint in classifying 
punishment. The paper defines punishment as any bid in the SAPA where the buyer exposes 
himself to a loss if the bid were final.  Punishments may occur where a buyer is not bidding 
above his value but he is bidding up another buyer’s price.  Such actions are not classified as 
punishment bids because a buyer could be trying to obtain the item for profit rather than for 
punishment.   
 Punishments can be broken down into directed and undirected punishments.  A buyer 
bidding above his value on another’s most preferred item after the other buyer has bid on his 
most preferred item in that round is a directed punishment.  An undirected punishment is any 
other bid above one’s valuation. 
 
Result 1-7:  Punishment occurs in the auctions studied.  Mavericks use both undirected and 
directed punishments.   Non-mavericks use directed punishment against the maverick(s).   
Support.  Occasionally, but persistently, in the six experiments, buyers bid above their value on 
items that were not their most preferred.  Bidding above one’s valuation could be due to 
confusion, but the only reported cases of subject confusion occurred in round 1.  Excluding the 
results of round 1 from the analysis, there were 282 bids that are over the buyer’s value out of 
5113 bids (5.5%).  The number may seem small, but it is not expected to be great.  Most bids in 
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the experiments were buyers bidding on their most preferred item or a maverick bidding on all 
items.   
 Of the 282 punishments, 144 were directed and 138 undirected.  As Table 12 shows, 
mavericks provide a great amount (93%) of the undirected punishment observed.  They also are 
responsible for a slight majority of directed punishment (57%).  Mavericks are more likely to use 
undirected punishment (128/208) than directed (80/208). 
There were 64 directed punishments that were not done by mavericks, and of these, 48 
(75%) are directed toward mavericks.  The other 25% often occur in early rounds as “bidding 
wars” between two buyers who share high values for the same two items.  Adding punishments 
by mavericks (128 undirected and 80 directed) to punishments directed at mavericks (48) 
suggests that mavericks are responsible for 256 of 282 punishments (91%).  
 It is likely the case that punishments of mavericks are done to promote cooperative 
behavior as the model suggests.  The punishments are immediate and reactive, not lasting; 
otherwise they would prevent the buyer-preferred allocation from being reached. After a round 
of punishment, it is even possible to move directly to the buyer-preferred allocation as in 
experiment 3 (which featured punishment in round 8).   
 The overwhelming majority of undirected punishments are done by mavericks.  These 
actions imply that a maverick often exhibits a bit of spitefulness.  In a few of the experiments, 
notably experiments 1 and 5 (two experiments with a clear single maverick), the maverick had a 
tendency to indiscriminately bid on all items the round after he received punishment.16    
                                                 
16 The maverick in experiment 5 was dismissed from the experiment room last so that the experimenter could ask 
him about his strategy.  The maverick explained that he wanted to earn more in comparison to what everyone else 
was earning.  Hence, he purposefully, and spitefully, drove up the prices of the items so that others would earn less 
compared to what he earned.  He admitted that he did not think he was following the best strategy and he speculated 
(correctly) that he probably earned the least of the subjects. 
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 Punishment can be classified further in a few special cases.  Punishments where a buyer 
chose to bid over everyone’s valuation is called “expressive punishment” because that buyer has 
paid a heavy cost to express his displeasure at the buyer who most prefers that item.  There is 
also a “punishment defense” where a buyer chooses to let the buyer who has punished him take 
that item at a loss rather than overbidding and acquiring his most preferred item at a profit. 
 
Result 1-8:  Neither expressive punishment nor punishment defense are sustainable in the 
SAPA.  Expressive punishment is always directed and may be used against a maverick.  
Punishment defense is most often used against a maverick’s undirected punishments to 
prohibit that behavior. 
Support. There are 4 instances where expressive punishment occurred or 1.6% of all 
punishments; all 4 were directed punishments but only 2 of the 4 were directed toward the 
maverick.  The fact that 4 of these punishments are directed punishments suggests bidding above 
everyone’s value is intended as a communication device.   
 Punishment defense occurred in 8 bids.  In 6 of these 8 instances, the original punishment 
was undirected and in 5 of the 6 undirected punishments the original punishment is done by a 
maverick.  Hence, the reverse punishment can serve to punish a maverick who is arbitrarily 
bidding above his valuation. 
 Neither expressive punishment nor punishment defense occurred frequently (1.6% and 
3.3% of all punishments respectively).  Expressive punishment and punishment defense likely 
could not be sustained because of their high costs.  Expressive punishment requires buyers to 
take a real loss because expressive punishments are above everyone’s valuation on an item.  
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Punishment defense requires buyers to endure an great opportunity cost as buyers do not acquire 
their most preferred item in a round.    
  
Part 6.2 The Simultaneous Descending Price Auction  
After the buyer preferred allocation had been obtained and persisted for several rounds in the 
SAPA or where time constraints were reached, the institution was changed to the SDPA.  It is 
important to notice that at the time of the institutional change a full tacit collusion was operating.  
Li and Plott demonstrate that many treatments suggested by theory, such as the removal of 
information, are not effective in changing the allocations from the buyer preferred level to the 
seller preferred.  The next results show that the change in the institution has a dramatic effect on 
the allocation in favor of the seller and does so for understandable reasons.  
 Recall that Theorem 5 demonstrates that the buyer preferred allocation cannot be 
supported as an equilibrium under the SDPA.  None of the supporting strategies that are found in 
the SAPA are available for use in the SDPA.  Result 2-1 makes clear that the institution does 
have the impact that the theory suggests.  
 
Result 2-1:  An institutional change from the SAPA to SDPA destroys the buyer-preferred 
equilibrium and moves the resulting allocation toward the seller preferred allocation.   
Support. Figures 1A-1F show the average price in each experiment by round.  The switch from 
the SAPA to SDPA is indicated by the leftmost vertical line through each graph.  The titles of 
each chart as well as Table 3 also indicate when the auction was switched to SDPA.  The graphs 
show an immediate jump in prices away from the buyer-preferred allocation of 10.  Figure 1D 
shows the most dramatic jump in experiment 4 as average price moved from 10 to 592 from 
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period 11 to 12.  The sale price of items jumped on average 387 units after the shift.  There is no 
evidence from the graphs of prices ever again coming near an average price of 10.  Table 13 
shows the average price of items sold in the SDPA auction is 610.85 (first row, second column).  
The number 610.85 is also the average of the average prices in all 54 descending price auctions.  
The standard deviation of the average prices is 141.78.  The buyer-preferred average price of 10 
can be rejected from the distribution of SDPA average prices at any reasonable level of 
significance (p<0.001).  Table 13 indicates that the Pareto efficient allocation occurred in only 3 
out of 54 rounds of the SDPA (row 7, column 2).  A Pareto efficient allocation must occur if 
every buyer was cooperative, so at most in three instances every buyer was cooperative.  The 
data suggest that even if substantially more experiments were run, it is unlikely the buyer-
preferred equilibrium would be reached. 
 Theorem 5 demonstrates that a buyer-preferred allocation cannot be supported as an 
equilibrium in the SDPA.  As the results indicate, the data are not near the buyer preferred 
allocation.  Appendix 1, Lemma 6 also indicates no other equilibrium exists other than the seller-
preferred equilibrium in the single period model of the auction. Full convergence to the seller-
preferred equilibrium is not observed.  The repeated nature of the experiment may have been 
responsible for the deviations from that level.  (See result 2-4.)   
 Figures 1A-1F show that price levels do not linger or return to the buyer preferred 
equilibrium after a change of institution.  In Figure 1F, the average price never reaches 440 units 
of the buyer-preferred level.  That is, there is no evidence of a hysteresis at the buyer-preferred 
allocation after an institutional change, except perhaps in experiment 2 round 12 (Figure 1B).  
The lag in round 12 only lasted one period.  By round 13, the price had moved away from the 
28  
buyer preferred equilibrium.  Prices are closer to the seller-preferred equilibrium than in the 
SAPA.  
 
Result 2-2:  The choice of institution (SPDA or SAPA) has an effect on prices, allocations 
and efficiencies.  The SAPA provides lower prices and more efficiency than the SDPA. 
Support. Table 13 shows the overall average price.  That price is considerably higher in the 
SPDA than SAPA (row 1). 
 The SAPA has more efficient outcomes.  Table 13 shows the SAPA is roughly 4% more 
efficient than the SDPA (row 6).  The difference is better expressed when one notes that the 
Pareto efficient allocation, the outcome where each buyer receives his most preferred good, 
occurred in only 3 of 54 rounds17 in the SDPA (row 7, column 2).  The SAPA achieved the 
Pareto efficient allocation 63 out of 78 times.  The SDPA does not achieve the Pareto optimal 
allocation often.  The model did not predict the Pareto efficient allocation would occur so rarely.  
The lack of Pareto efficient allocations is understandable given the properties of the auction, 
specifically, that there are limited responses to each bid.  The buyer who values an item the most 
cannot respond to any other bids on that item. 
 There appears to be a price floor in the SDPA. Of the combined 432 items sold in the 
SDPA, only 18 items (4.2%) were sold below their third valuation, the level of exposure to a 
third buyer.  Conversely, 42.6% of goods in the SAPA were sold below the average third 
valuation.  Trades that occur below the third valuation level rely on cooperation among more 
than two buyers.  Recall that collusion beyond more than two buyers is not often found in the 
theoretical literature (see section 3.1).  
                                                 
17 Two of these three cases occurred with hidden IDs (see result 2-4). 
29  
 
Result 2-3:  Punishments in the SDPA were costly and rarely occurred.  Punishments in the 
SDPA were not a credible threat and could not enforce cooperative behavior.   
Support.  As mentioned earlier, punishments in the SAPA often preceded the buyer-preferred 
equilibrium.  That institution was characterized by relatively costless punishment.  The SDPA 
did not have costless punishments.  An average punishment cost subjects 267.08 units ($1.34) 
per punishment.   
 In the 54 rounds of the SDPA in the experiment, there were 85 steals.  Steals, a clear 
instance of non-cooperative behavior, occur when a buyer wins another’s most preferred item at 
a profit.  In only two instances were these steals met with an immediate punishment in that round 
or the next round.  Of the 35 subjects (of 48) that stole an item at some point in the SDPA, only 
15 ever encountered a punishment after their steal(s), and it is unclear whether that punishment 
was a response to uncooperative behavior (see Table 14 for other explanations of punishment).  
Most likely, the high cost of punishment caused buyers not to use punishment to enforce 
cooperative behavior.  If buyers would not use punishment, then punishment can no longer be an 
effective deterrent of non-cooperative behavior.   
 In total, there were only 26 punishments in the six experiments, less than one punishment 
every two rounds.  Table 14 shows the suspected cause of these punishments. 
 Quick trigger punishments (Table 14, row 3) are those when a buyer takes a slight loss by 
acquiring another’s item too early.  Indiscriminate frustration punishments are those punishments 
in which a buyer took another’s item at a loss when the other had done nothing to him (row 2).  
Both quick-trigger and indiscriminate frustration punishments can be classified as undirected.  
They account for 18 punishments.  Table 14 shows of the eight directed punishments, half are 
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responses to other punishments (row 4, column 2), thus punishing others may have a greater cost 
than just the loss one takes on acquiring items.  Punishment to enforce cooperation (row 1) 
accounted for less than one fourth (4/26) of all punishment.  Thus, in 54 rounds only 4 times was 
punishment used to enforce cooperation.  
 Curiously, the seller preferred equilibrium was not observed even though it is the unique 
equilibrium of the one shot game model of the auction.  Given the previously successful tacit 
collusion among buyers, it was suspected that reputations might play a role.  Even though the 
buyers were involved in the SDPA, they still had full information about prices and thus knew 
who had the “second highest” and “third highest” valuations of their items.  The next result 
demonstrates that elements of “trust” remained in the sense that buyers expected certain other 
buyers to continue to follow a “cooperative strategy”.  The treatment was to remove the 
identification of participants so residual reputations could not play a role. 
 
Result 2-4:  Removing IDs from subjects in the SDPA increases average price and 
efficiency.  There is an immediate movement to the seller-preferred allocation.  Prices do 
not drop after multiple rounds indicating the existence of an equilibrium.    
Support.  In two experiments after subjects had experienced a few rounds of the SDPA, subject 
ID information from purchases was removed.  Rounds 21-27 of experiment 4 and rounds 23-25 
of experiment 6 featured no ID information.  Figures 1D and 1F indicate the removal of subject 
IDs in the SDPA by the rightmost vertical bar through the graph.  The average prices to the right 
of the rightmost vertical bar are all very near the average second valuation line, the seller-
preferred allocation average price (the top horizontal line in the graph).  Figures 1D and 1F show 
no evidence of a hysteresis when IDs are removed – the movement to the average second 
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valuation is immediate.  The lack of hysteresis is indicated by the movement from round 20 to 21 
in figure 1D and round 22 to 23 in figure 1F.  Prices do not drop after the seller-preferred 
allocation is reached.  They remain at that level. 
 Table 15 gives a comparison between IDs and no IDs in each SDPA.  Notice that the 
average price is higher with hidden IDs (row 1).  The auction also has more efficient outcomes 
(row 6), probably caused by individuals acquiring their most preferred item before that item is 
valuable to someone else.  In more than half of all observations (45/80), an item is purchased at a 
price greater than its second highest valuation (row 9, column 2).  In those cases, the item is 
usually (38/45) acquired within 10 francs (5 seconds) of the second highest valuation (row 11, 
column 2 minus row 9, column 2).  The movement to the seller-preferred equilibrium can be 
most supported by the last two columns of Table 15 which show over 76% (61/80) of items sold 
are within 10 francs of seller-preferred allocation value.  Theorem 4 proves that seller-preferred 
equilibrium exists and is unique in a one shot game; it appears that removing IDs can make the 
repeated SDPA in this experiment more like a single-shot game.  
 In all rounds that are close to the seller preferred allocation, it is impossible to observe 
the strategy buyers are using with items which are not their most preferred.  Buyers bid on their 
most preferred item before it is exposed to other buyers.  Thus, one cannot conclude what 
strategy is being played and if it sustains an equilibrium.  It is very likely strategies that sustain 
Theorem 4 are being used because buyers are repeatedly buying their most preferred item before 
exposure to a second buyer.  They would only do this if (i) the second buyer will likely bid on 
their item or (ii) they are making a mistake about the intentions of the second buyer.  Since these 
buyers have bid with each other for over an hour, they probably have decent intuition into the 
strategy of other buyers, and likely are not making a mistake.  Most likely the strategies that 
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support the seller preferred allocation as an equilibrium are being used.  There is some direct 
evidence that buyers will take their non-most preferred item when it is exposed to them.  Of the 
80 items that were sold with no IDs in the SDPA, only 12 were bought under ten points below 
the second highest buyer valuation (Table 15: Row 3 – Row 11 – Row 13).  In those 12 trades, 6 
were taken by the buyer with the second highest valuation, a rate of non-cooperative bidding that 
is much higher than in other conditions of this experiment. 
 The power of the removal of the IDs and thus the associated reputation effects is of 
particular interest.  Li and Plott found removal of IDs alone did not terminate the collusive 
equilibrium in the SAPA auction.  Since cooperation in the SDPA is not fully collusive - buyers 
only cooperate with one other buyer - it is likely reputation effects are more important than in a 
fully collusive equilibrium.  For that reason, removal of IDs matter here, but have no effect in the 
SAPA once the buyer preferred equilibrium is sustained in Li and Plott’s experiment.  Once the 
buyer-preferred equilibrium is achieved, everyone must be trusted so specific IDs are not 
important. 
7. Summary of Conclusions 
 A very special economic environment developed by Li and Plott can be viewed as a type 
of “collusion incubator” in the sense when the institution is the simultaneous ascending price 
auction, tacit collusion develops quickly to the disadvantage of the seller.  Previous research 
demonstrated that such collusions are indeed hard to “break up” and once established the normal 
remedies suggested by game theory and associated industrial organization literature simply do 
not work or certainly are not as powerful as one might like. The tacit collusions remain.  The 
experiments reported here explored the sources of the strength of such collusive patterns of 
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behavior together with institutional changes that would undermine those sources of strength and 
thereby break the collusive patterns.  
 The experiments reported here found strong evidence for tacit collusion in the SAPA, 
consistent with Li and Plott.  Over the first rounds of the experiment, the SAPA auction’s prices 
decreased greatly.  Their range moved from those in the seller-preferred allocation (which can be 
sustained as an equilibrium) to the buyer-preferred allocation (which can be sustained and indeed 
was sustained as an equilibrium).  The study of the evolution of behavior revealed a type of 
transition of behavior at the individual level.  The movement of prices from the seller-preferred 
allocation to buyer-preferred equilibrium is represented by a buyer’s transition from non-
cooperative to cooperative behavior, where cooperative behavior is defined independent of prices 
in the auction to avoid tautological reasoning.  These transitions of behavior are facilitated by 
strategies of retaliation and punishment until all eight buyers are cooperative.  Of particular 
interest in this regard, are buyers who are characterized as “mavericks”, who resist conforming to 
the cooperative strategies of others.  One non-cooperative holdout can remove the allocation 
from the buyer-preferred equilibrium.  Often punishment is used to force this maverick to realize 
that he is not following a best response strategy to the bids of the seven other cooperators.  Once 
the buyer-preferred equilibrium is achieved, it persists.  It is observed to last up to five periods in 
the SAPA. 
 Once the auction is switched to a SDPA, the buyer-preferred equilibrium is destroyed and 
the data respond substantially as predicted by the model.  The response is immediate and 
dramatic but the prices do not move all of the way to the unique equilibrium, which is the value 
of the second highest valuation.  The prices stay above the third valuation in almost all cases in 
this auction, but rarely reach the second highest valuation, the level predicted by the model. 
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 It is not fully clear why prices do not reach the seller-preferred levels in the SDPA.  The 
data support a conjecture that the multiple periods cause subjects to learn the cooperative natures 
of their partners and consequently subjects choose to not engage in non-cooperative behavior 
because of such reputation effects.  The models address only the behavior of a single period but 
tested the conjecture that more complex behavior was involved by eliminating subject IDs in two 
of the experiments.  In those rounds, prices quickly converged to those in the seller-preferred 
equilibria.  The information associated with subject IDs together with established reputations for 
cooperation could be necessary to sustain prices below the second price level in the SDPA. 
 The question remains why prices would not fall below the third price level in the 
presence of subject IDs in the SDPA.  A possible explanation is that a buyer may trust his partner 
and the buyer who values his item third, but may believe his partner does not trust the buyer that 
values his item third.  In that case, a buyer suspects that if the item falls below its third valuation, 
his partner will take it to prevent it from being taken by the buyer who values the item third 
most.  If a buyer believes his partner would take an item after it falls below the third price level, 
then the buyer would take it right before that price.  Alternatively, it may be too risky for most 
individuals to trust more than one person.  The theoretical properties of collusion models that 
only apply to two buyers may also be involved.  Whatever the reason, very few bids occur below 
the third price level in the SDPA. 
 Not surprisingly, revenue equivalence does not occur in ascending and descending price 
auctions with these types of valuations.  Sellers would do much better with a SDPA because 
other equilibria more favorable to the buyer do not exist.  On average, sellers in these markets 
made over three times the revenue in a SDPA auction than a SAPA.  The seller would do even 
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better if they were able to have the auction be anonymous without anyone knowing the bids of 
other buyers.   
 While it contains very unique preferences, the collusion incubator in this experiment is 
important as a test bed for studies that focus on methods of creating competition under 
circumstances where tacit collusion is thought to exist.  Institutional changes have great power in 
this context, especially when they remove the capacity for facilitating behaviors.  This feature is 
well illustrated by the power of a descending auction in breaking up collusion.  The quick 
manner in which a non-cooperative buyer can steal goods as well as the high cost of punishment 
is the source of the institution’s power.   
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Table 1:  An example of subject valuations of items 
  Item # 
S
u
b
je
ct
 I
D
 #
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
121 833 212 706 101 290 180 317 94 
122 787 164 893 69 325 223 266 146 
123 327 121 284 214 782 76 808 187 
124 252 55 303 158 856 105 738 241 
125 238 844 194 343 81 745 106 277 
126 159 788 218 276 122 841 75 340 
127 143 303 52 848 157 280 235 796 
128 81 266 116 795 215 342 181 827 
 
Table 2:  Procedural differences in SAPA and SDPA auctions 
SAPA SDPA 
Buyers can place bids on all items at 
start (simultaneity). 
Buyers can place bids on all items at 
start (simultaneity). 
A bid on an item purchases it if no other 
buyer bids over that bid. 
A bid on an item purchases it. 
Buyers must place a bid higher than the 
last bid (if applicable) on any item. 
The price buyers may bid on an item 
decreases following a fixed rate unless 
that item has been purchased already. 
The auction ends when no buyer takes 
any action for a preset time interval. 
The auction ends when all items have 
been purchased, or the price reaches 
zero. 
 
Table 3:  Design of Experiments 1-6 
Experiment 1 2 3 4 5 6 
date 2005/01/19 2005/01/26 2005/02/07 2005/04/27 2005/05/02 2005/05/11 
total rounds 15 21 23 28 21 25 
SAPA rounds 1-10 1-11 1-12 1-11 1-16 1-18 
SDPA rounds 11-15 12-21 13-23 12-20 17-21 19-22 
blank ID rounds NA NA NA 22-28 NA 23-25 
duration  
(in minutes) 87 111 114 109 115 128 
 
40 
Table 4:  Regressions of round number on Average Price, Duration, Bid Number and Cooperative 
Bidders (SAPA rounds only) 
 
average 
price duration 
number of 
bids 
cooperative 
bidders 
round 
-50.63*** -12.88*** -24.88*** 0.41*** 
(3.80) (1.38) (4.45) (0.028) 
exp 2 
87.43 26.08 26.64 0.59 
(59.19) (21.57) (69.35) 0.43 
exp 3 
150.97* -2.95 -79.34 -0.19 
(58.10) (21.17) (68.07) 0.42 
exp 4 
-450.64*** -107.20*** -238.77*** 3.06*** 
(53.50) (19.49) (62.68) (0.39) 
exp 5 
177.65** 44.40* 60.65 -0.75 
(55.76) (20.32) (65.33) 0.41 
exp 6 
447.87*** 71.37*** 80.77 -2.29 
(55.52) (20.23) (65.05) 0.41 
cons 
481.49*** 150.86*** 386.64 2.94*** 
(47.64) (17.36) (55.82) (0.35) 
r2 0.7543 0.5867 0.3784 0.7753 
*p-value<0.05  **p-value<0.01 ***p-value<0.001 
 
Table 5:  Cooperation in SAPA by Subject and Round in Experiment 1 (0 indicates cooperative behavior) 
subj\rd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
121 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 6 
122 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
123 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 6 
124 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
126 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
127 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
128 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Total 5 4 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 1 28 
 
Table 6:  Cooperation in SAPA by Subject and Round in Experiment 2 (0 indicates cooperative behavior) 
subj\rd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total 
121 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
122 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
123 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
124 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
125 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 7 
126 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
127 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
128 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 
Total 7 4 3 2 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 22 
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Table 7:  Cooperation in SAPA by Subject and Round in Experiment 3 (0 indicates cooperative behavior) 
subj\rd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
121 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 7 
122 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 8 
123 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
124 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
125 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
126 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
127 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
128 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Total 6 6 5 5 3 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 31 
 
Table 8:  Cooperation in SAPA by Subject and Round in Experiment 4 (0 indicates cooperative behavior) 
subj\rd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total 
121 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
122 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
123 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
124 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
125 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
126 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
127 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
128 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 7 
Total 6 4 5 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 20 
 
Table 9:  Cooperation in SAPA by Subject and Round in Experiment 5 (0 indicates cooperative behavior) 
subj\rd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Total 
121 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
122 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
123 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
124 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
125 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
126 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
127 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
128 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 13 
Total 6 4 5 4 2 2 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 37 
 
 
Table 10: Cooperation in SAPA by Subject and Round in Experiment 6 (0 indicates cooperative behavior) 
subj\rd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 total 
121 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 16 
122 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 12 
123 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
124 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
125 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 13 
126 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
127 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
128 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 7 5 5 5 5 6 5 4 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 0 0 1 62 
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Table 11:  Regressions estimating price convergence 
 
value 
(std error) 
11B  
481.16** 
(154.98) 
12B  
831.15*** 
(154.84) 
13B  
799.94*** 
(154.76) 
14B  
-614.57** 
(214.32) 
15B  
743.51*** 
(154.79) 
16B  
1275.33*** 
(154.92) 
2B  
116.37*** 
(30.15) 
r2 0.7797 
**p-value<0.01 ***p-value<0.001 
Table 12:  Types of punishment used by mavericks and non-mavericks 
 
Directed 
Punishments 
Undirected 
Punishments 
Done by the Maverick(s) 80 (57%) 128 (93%)
Not Done by the Maverick(s) 64 (43%) 10 (7%)
 
Table 13:  Comparison of prices, allocations, and efficiencies between SAPA and SDPA rounds 
 SAPA SDPA 
Avg Price 285.12 610.85 
Rounds 78 54 
Goods Sold 624 432 
Total Redemption Value of Sales 519,703 346,235 
Total Possible Redemption Value 526,500 364,500 
Percent Efficient 98.7% 95.0% 
Pareto Efficient Allocations 63 3 
Percent of Rounds 80.77% 5.55% 
Trades under 3rd value 266 18 
Percent of Trades 42.6% 4.2% 
 
Table 14: Types of Punishments used by buyers in SDPA 
 Number Pct 
Enforcing cooperation 4 15.4% 
Indiscriminate frustration 9 34.6% 
Quick trigger 9 34.6% 
Response to punishment 4 15.4% 
Total 26 100% 
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Table 15:  Comparison of prices, allocations, and efficiencies between SDPA rounds with visible and 
hidden subject IDs 
 ID no ID 
Avg Price 577.41 758.00 
Total Rounds 44 10 
Goods Sold 352 80 
Total Value of Sales 279,480 66,755 
Total Possible Value 297,000 67,500 
Percent Efficient 94.1% 98.9% 
Trades under 3rd value 18 0 
Percent of Trades 5.1% 0% 
Over 2nd valuation 72 45 
Percent 20.5% 56.2% 
Over 2nd by more than 10 35 7 
Percent 9.9% 8.8% 
within 10 of 2nd 74 61 
Percent 21.0% 76.2% 
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Figures 1A-1C*: 
Figure 1A - Experimet 1: Average Transaction Price by Round
Simultaneous Descending Price Auction Begins in Round 11
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Figure 1B - Experimet 2: Average Transaction Price by Round
Simultaneous Descending Price Auction Begins in Round 12
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Figure 1C - Experimet 3: Average Transaction Price by Round
Simultaneous Descending Price Auction Begins in Round 13
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*Top horizontal line represents both the seller-preferred equilibrium and exposure to the 2nd buyer, the middle horizontal line 
represents exposure to the third buyer and the bottom horizontal line (at average price = 10) represents the buyer-preferred 
equilibrium. The vertical lines demarcate when a change occurs, from SAPA to SDPA or from SDPA to blank IDs. 
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Figures 1D-1F*: 
Figure 1D - Experimet 4: Average Transaction Price by Round
Simultaneous Descending Price Auction Begins in Round 12. Subject Identification Removed in Round 21
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Figure 1E - Experimet 5: Average Transaction Price by Round
Simultaneous Descending Price Auction Begins in Round 17
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Figure 1F - Experimet 6: Average Transaction Price by Round
Simultaneous Descending Price Auction Begins in Round 19. Subject  Ident if icat ion Removed in Round 23
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*Top horizontal line represents both the seller-preferred equilibrium and exposure to the 2nd buyer, the middle horizontal line 
represents exposure to the third buyer and the bottom horizontal line (at average price = 10) represents the buyer-preferred 
equilibrium. The vertical lines demarcate when a change occurs, from SAPA to SDPA or from SDPA to blank IDs. 
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Figures 2A-2B:  
Figure 2A - Number of Bids in All Experiments (exp)
Simultaneous Ascending Price Auction Rounds Only 
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Figure 2B - Duration of Rounds in All Experiments (exp)
Simultaneous Ascending Price Auction Rounds Only 
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Figures 3A-3C 
Figure 3A - All Experiments, Average Number of Non-cooperative 
Subjects Rounds 1-10 
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Figure 3B - Exps 1-4, Number of Non-Cooperative Subjects
Simultaneous Ascending Price Auction Only
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Figure 3C - Experiments 5-6, Non-Cooperative Subjects by Round
Simultaneous Ascending Price Auction Only
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 Figures 4A-4F: 
Figure 4A - Experiment 1, Non-Cooperative Bids Tied to Maverick 
Simultaneous Ascending Price Auction Only
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Figure 4B - Experiment 2, Non-Cooperative Bids Tied to Maverick
Simultaneous Ascending Price Auction Only
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Figure 4C - Experiment 3, Competitive Bids Tied to Maverick
Simultaneous Ascending Price Auction Only
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Figure 4D - Experiment 4, Non-Cooperative Bids Tied to Maverick 
Simultaneous Ascending Price Auction Only
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Figure 4E - Experiment 5, Non-Cooperative Bids Tied to Maverick
 Simultaneous Ascending Price Auction Only
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Figure 4F - Exp 6, Non-Cooperative Bids Tied to Maverick
Simultaneous Ascending Price Auction Only
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Experiment Instructions 
 
Today you will be participating in a series of auctions with multiple items for sale. Before each auction, 
you will receive a sheet of paper, which contains your and other subjects’ valuations of the items. A 
sample valuation sheet looks like the following: 
 
Items 
S
ub
je
ct
s 
 1 2 3 4
121 128 207 5 434
122 318 372 25 94
123 357 295 325 168
124 422 197 152 780
 
The unit of valuation is in francs.  In the table above, for example, subject 123 values Item 2 at 295 francs 
(in bold; intersection of highlighted row and column).  Subject 123 also values items 1, 3, and 4 at values 
of 357, 325, and 168 francs respectively.  In this experiment, two francs are equivalent to one cent. 
 
In each round, a subject’s earning is the sum of his profits from all the items he acquires. The profit that a 
subject makes on each item equals his valuation minus his final bid.  For example, if subject 4 acquires 
item 1 and 4 with price 322 and 600, then his profit equals  (422-322)+(780-600)=280 francs. 
A subject’s total earning in this experiment equals the sum of his earnings in each round. The subjects 
will be paid in cash when the experiment ends.  
 
Recording Items Acquired: 
 
In this example, in some round, let’s say 5, subject 4 has acquired items 1 and 4 at price 322 and 600.  He 
should record these transactions in his record sheet as follows: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice that subject 4 has recorded his valuation from his first table into this table under “value”.  “Gain” 
is the difference of value over price. 
 
A description of how items are acquired is explained on a separate diagram. 
 
Round 
Item 
Purchased Price Value Gain 
  5  1  322  422  100 
   4  600  780  180 
         
